India’s Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons: Doctrinal Shifts and Escalation Risks in South Asia

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61732/bj.v4i2.250

Keywords:

Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons (SNNWs), First Strike, Deterrence, Escalation, Crisis Instability, Inadvertent Escalation

Abstract

Building on my previously published work examining the destabilizing effects of India’s development and deployment of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons (SNNWs), this paper explores how these advanced technologies are reshaping India’s doctrinal thinking, thereby increasing the risk of escalation in South Asia. Academic discourse on SNNWs reflects that SNNWs are a complex and contested concept. However, they broadly encompass a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic technologies, such as precision-guided conventional missiles, autonomous drones, hypersonic weapons, and offensive cyber capabilities. These technologies are regarded as strategic because they increase the vulnerability of an adversary’s nuclear forces, alter escalation dynamics, and introduce new variables into the deterrence calculus. In the case of the Pakistan-India deterrence equation, India’s growing investment in such capabilities, coupled with its evolving nuclear posture and its tendency to accept risks, presents a dangerous shift in regional stability. This trend became evident during the May 2025 crisis, when India conducted conventional missile strikes, conducted cyber intrusions, launched massive misinformation campaigns, and employed unmanned platforms against Pakistan. Such actions indicate a potential normalization of the integration of preemptive force multipliers within the conventional domain. Therefore, this paper argues that India’s acquisition of SNNWs, when viewed in conjunction with its doctrinal assertiveness, undermines the deterrence based on survivability of forces and heightens the risks of misperception, inadvertent escalation, and crisis instability. Using qualitative analysis grounded in open-source reporting and doctrinal reviews, the paper highlights the need to reassess the evolving role of SNNWs in the South Asian strategic environment, given the advent of advanced technologies. Moreover, it analyzes their implications and focuses on regional risk-reduction mechanisms to maintain strategic stability.

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Author Biography

Ahyousha Khan, Associate Director, Strategic Vision Institute

Ahyousha Khan is an Associate Director at the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. She has been associated with the SVI since 2017. She is an M.Phil. in Defence and Strategic Studies, from Quaid e Azam University, Islamabad.

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Published

2025-12-31

How to Cite

Khan, A. (2025). India’s Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons: Doctrinal Shifts and Escalation Risks in South Asia. BTTN Journal , 4(2), 94–121. https://doi.org/10.61732/bj.v4i2.250