Dark Side of the Moon: Sanctions, Security, and Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran

Abstract

Although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not explicitly mention it, the idea that sanctions can be used as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is not new. The earliest mention of it appears in the 1946 Baruch Plan, which suggested imposing a penalty on potential violators. Since the 1970s, sanctions have been used to discourage states from building nuclear weapons. Such sanctions were imposed at both bilateral and multilateral levels. The proposed paper aims to analyse the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool for disarmament and non-proliferation. While examining this broader point, this paper argues that an important yet often overlooked point in the sanctions literature is the end point of the sanctions. How would those who comply and end their programs to get out of sanctions be treated by the US and other actors imposing sanctions on them? How would they be treated post-sanctions? Would they be treated differently once they accept the conditions, alter their policy, and refrain from proliferating to avoid sanctions? What if the sanctioned state realizes that whatever it does, the sanctions will not be lifted? How would this realization affect their behaviour and resolve? In such cases, can sanctions be taken as an effective non-proliferation tool? President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the JCPOA and impose new and stricter sanctions against Iran in 2018, which the Biden administration maintains is a case in point. How did the Iranians view the JCPOA? And the American withdrawal? Did it reinforce the belief that only a nuclear weapon would guarantee Iran’s security? Using data collected through interviews and surveys, supplemented by data from the Toronto-based Iran Poll, this paper aims to answer these questions.