



RESEARCH ARTICLE

**Politicization of Public Administration: A Case Study of Capital City Police Officers (CCPOs) of Lahore**

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Article Info	Abstract
<p><b>Article History:</b></p> <p><i>Received:</i> March 20, 2023</p> <p><i>Revised:</i> June 20, 2022</p> <p><i>Accepted:</i> June 28, 2022</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> Politicization, Public Administration, CCPO Lahore, Clientelism, Clientelist, Transfers</p>	<p><i>The study aims to identify the reason behind the abrupt transfer of CCPOs of Lahore from 2018 to 2022. It examines the client-patron relation between these officers and political elites by reviewing literature, secondary data and through semi-structured interviews as well. It shows how public offices, specifically the police department, are politicized in Pakistan? The four elements given by Hicken in his theory of clientelism – are used to analyze the data collected through secondary sources and interviews. It is found that abrupt transfers of CCPOs of Lahore are politicized and not based on performance. The study shows the presence of client-patron relations between officers transferred to and from the CCPO post and political elites who controlled these transfers. On the basis of the findings, the following recommendations are made: political will, public participation, separation of power, non-politicization of police departments, societal changes, public awareness and merit-based promotion in order to rectify the situation.</i></p>

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## Introduction

The politicization of public administration in Pakistan is not something that emerged out of the blue. The culture of give and take is very common in the public administration system of Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> “Politicization”, in the words of the Pillar, is described as compromising objectivity.<sup>2</sup> Wiesner and Chinn, Hart & Soroka<sup>3</sup> suggested that politicization is linked with political polarization.<sup>4</sup> Anders's study shows that politicization can have a democratizing effect and can increase political choice.<sup>5</sup> Henderson argues that the politicization of a group is more likely to occur when justifications for political violence are considered acceptable within a society, or in the absence of norms condemning violence.<sup>6</sup> According to the above discussion, politicization is a tool used by leaders to compromise objectivity and to increase their political choices in a society where there is an absence of norms condemning violence.

Public administration as a subject developed in 1880 when Woodrow Wilson promoted civil service reforms, moving public administration to academia. According to Wilson, public administration is a detailed and systematic application of law.<sup>7</sup> Dimock described Public Administration as the fulfillment or enforcement of public policy as declared by the competent authorities. Public administration is a law in action. It is the executive side of government. Finally, Leonard D. White said that Public Administration consists of all those operations having for their purpose

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<sup>1</sup> Ishtiaq Jamil, Tek Nath Dhakal, and Narendra Raj Paudel, “Introduction: Understanding Civil Service in South Asia,” *Civil Service Management and Administrative Systems in South Asia*, June 26 (2018), 1–24, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90191-6\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90191-6_1).

<sup>2</sup> Paul R. Pillar, “The Perils of Politicization,” Edited by Loch K. Johnson. *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*, March 12 (2010), 471–84, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195375886.003.0029>.

<sup>3</sup> Sedona Chinn, P. Sol Hart, and Stuart Soroka. “Politicization and Polarization in Climate Change News Content, 1985-2017.” *Science Communication*, Vol. 42, No. 1, January 29 (2020), 112–29, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547019900290>.

<sup>4</sup> Claudia Wiesner, “Between Optimism and Pessimism: Rethinking EU Politicization in Theory, Conceptualization, and Research.” *Tracing the Politicization of the EU*, November 2 (2021), 21–44. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82700-7_2).

<sup>5</sup> Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988).

<sup>6</sup> Errol A Henderson, “Ethnic Conflicts and Cooperation,” *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, January 1 (2008), 746–58, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-012373985-8.00062-3>.

<sup>7</sup> Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2, June (1887), 197–222, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2139277>.

the fulfillment or enforcement of public policy.<sup>8</sup> Public administration plays an important role in society. It is a non-political bureaucratic machinery that works in the political context to carry out the policy decision made by the government.

Public administration, specifically the department of Police, in Pakistan has always been criticized for its use as a tool by political leaders to achieve their objectives. As in the words of Huggins, he said that all policing is political, ranging on a continuum from police being very visible handmaids of organized power.<sup>9</sup> People are quick to bash this department of public administration, but people's thinking does not or rarely extend to the systematic inquiry as to why these administrators do that. For a more clear and concise understanding, the study focuses on the politicization of CCPOs of Lahore. The CCPO, Lahore supervises the overall functions of Capital City Police, Lahore. The primary functions are the prevention and detection of crime & maintenance of law & order.<sup>10</sup> Nine Lahore CCPOs were changed between June 7, 2018, and Aug 29, 2022, in Punjab. Based on this, the average tenure of the CCPOs in the province works out to an average of 4.5 months.<sup>11</sup> A recent scuffle between the federal and Punjab governments of Pakistan on the transfer of Ghulam Mahmood Dogar (former CCPO Lahore) shows how these transfers occur and on what basis. The transfer orders were later suspended by the apex court of Pakistan.<sup>12</sup>

This study is being conducted to find out the reason behind the abrupt transfers of CCPOs of Lahore. For that purpose, this study focuses on the formal and informal relations of these bureaucratic actors with the patrons who control or manage them, instead of focusing on the behavioral understanding of the actor. This article will also help us understand how the public administration, specifically, the police department in Pakistan is politicized and what reforms can be made to overcome this issue.

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<sup>8</sup> Herbert J. Storing, "Leonard D. White and the Study of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 25, No. 1, March (1965), 38, <https://doi.org/10.2307/974006>.

<sup>9</sup> Martha Knisely Huggins, *Political Policing*, (London: Duke University Press Books, 1998).

<sup>10</sup> Capital City Police Lahore, Government of the Punjab. "Overview | Capital City Police Lahore." Accessed January 24 (2023), <https://lahorepolice.punjab.gov.pk/overview>.

<sup>11</sup> Editorial, "Politicized Police." *DAWN.COM*, November 25 (2022), <https://www.dawn.com/news/1722960>.

<sup>12</sup> M. Nawaz, "SC Suspends Transfer Order of Former Lahore CCPO Ghulam Dogar," *The News International*, February 17 (2023), <https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.thenews.com.pk/amp/1041502-sc-suspends-lahore-ccpos-transfer-order>.

The study is qualitative and descriptive in nature. Data is collected through secondary sources and semi-structured interviews with five participants from different backgrounds such as journalist, lawyer, bureaucrat, political analyst, and a police officer. These participants were chosen for their relevant experience and expertise related to the case study. A semi-structured interview method is chosen because it allows participants to provide subjective viewpoints and in-depth information about their experiences. The interviews were conducted in-person and recorded with the consent of the participants. Data collected through the interviews was carefully analyzed to gain insights about the meanings, experiences, ideas, and realities of the participants. Furthermore, the researchers used a purposive sampling method with maximum variation sampling. This method allowed them to focus on a relatively small number of cases but still gain a wide range of perspectives. Despite the advantages of this method, the researchers faced limitations due to COVID-19 restrictions and lack of resources, which prevented them from reaching out to more participants. The small sample size is a potential limitation of the study, which the researchers acknowledge. Qualitative content analysis method is applied in which direct approach is used. In direct approach, the manifest meaning of the data collected is used for data analysis. The study is based on four elements presented by Hicken and will analyze the data according to these elements.

### **Historical Discourse of the Study**

The politicization of public administration is an important phenomenon to study because, if it is given free rein, this phenomenon can badly shake the very foundation of a democratic society.<sup>13</sup> Although in western political systems, a clear line is drawn between public administration and politics. Many changes in public administration in western societies have given more power to the administration rather than the politicians.<sup>14</sup> Despite the reforms in public administration, the politicization of public administration has survived as a consistent phenomenon internationally. Over time, the spread of politicization has increased along with its depth and breadth, with some countries having a long history with this problem and some being new to this disease.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> V. Merikoski, "The Politicization of Public Administration," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 39, No. 3, September (1973), 211–24, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002085237303900301>.

<sup>14</sup> Krister Ståhlberg, "The Politicization of Public Administration: Notes on the Concept, Causes and Consequences of Politicization," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 53, No. 3, September (1987), 363–82, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002085238705300303>.

<sup>15</sup> John Halligan, "Politicization of Public Services in Comparative Perspective," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, January 22 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1372>.

The Department of Police is one of the institutes of public administration that especially finds itself at the front end of this continuity. The linkages between the police and politics have been discussed by several scholars. Like in the words of Punch, police work has itself become politicized through the spread of terrorism, political demonstrations, and the recent wave of urban riots.<sup>16</sup> The politicization of police to achieve different objectives by political leaders further gives rise to different issues and develops further illegal frameworks like Partisanship. This client-patron relationship can be political and violent given the objective it is going to fulfill. Like in Bangladesh, the police in particular have been politicized and directed against the opposition under cover of maintaining law and order. Thus, police have developed a client-patron relationship with the politicians that gives benefits to both parties involved.<sup>17</sup>

In Pakistan, after independence, public administration swiftly started to play its role as they were trained to do by the British. Despite being short-handed, they began to work on issues like law and order, settlement of refugees, and allotment of land.<sup>18</sup> Public administration worked in those tough times without any offices and tools. It was due to their hard work and leadership competence that Pakistan began to function in the earlier days.<sup>19</sup> But, the demise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah provided the politicians of that time to interfere in the state affairs and particularly in the affairs of bureaucracy.<sup>20</sup> After that, many civil officers were punished by law due to their corrupt practices. The public have lost their trust in public administration ever since and regarded it as corrupt and unresponsive ever since.<sup>21</sup> Many governments after that have tried to introduce reforms to reinvigorate the trust of the public and for the better performance of public administration. But these reforms were no more than an instrument to achieve the interests of leaders or to casually pass their mandate without doing too much work.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Maurice Punch, *Control in the Police Organization*, (1983).

<sup>17</sup> David Jackman and Mathilde Maitrot, "The Party-Police Nexus in Bangladesh," *The Journal of Development Studies*, April 5 (2022), 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2022.2055463>.

<sup>18</sup> Albert Gorvine, "The Civil Service under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1965), 321–36, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4323879>.

<sup>19</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

<sup>20</sup> Senate of Pakistan, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988).

<sup>21</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG), "Reforming Pakistan's Civil Service - ICG Report – Pakistan," ReliefWeb, February 16 (2010), <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/reforming-pakistans-civil-service-icg-report>.

<sup>22</sup> Imran Ullah Khan, and Shahzad Hussain, "Bureaucracy and Public Management Reforms," *Hrvatska I Komparativna Javna Uprava*, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 31 (2020), 57–77, <https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.20.1.3>.

The Police Department of Pakistan further presents a grim picture of the contemporary situation of public administration in Pakistan. Pakistan inherited the police system from the colonizers. Britain enforced this system in this region of the world for the sake of keeping the population in check. The police system was designed as an extremely efficient hierarchical structure that was loyal to the leadership and regime to do their bidding rather than to maintain the rule of law.<sup>23</sup> Thus, these values that distorted this system survived even in contemporary times. Due to this reason, many problems arose in the Police Department in which a highly politicized force was one of the main issues.<sup>24</sup> Even in the contemporary times, this issue can be seen in the abrupt pattern of the transfer of CCPOs of Lahore along with many other examples where police are used to achieve the objectives of political leaders and elites rather than maintaining the rule of law. The fixed tenure of the CCPO according to the 2002 police order is three years.<sup>25</sup> But, that is all in the writings, the actual reports regarding the tenure of CCPOs of Lahore limit it to an average of four and a half months.

Ever since the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government of Imran Khan took charge of the country about six CCPOs have been changed in three years. DIG Bilal Siddique Kamyana is the sixth CCPO of Lahore appointed since 2018. He replaced Fayyaz Ahmad Dev who was transferred just a few days ago. After the PTI government takeover, Additional IG, BA Nasir continued as CCPO Lahore for a few months. He was replaced by Zulfiqar Hameed after that came Umar Sheikh. At the start of the new year, Umar Sheikh was replaced by Ghulam Mehmood Dogar.<sup>26</sup> Ghulam Mehmood Dogar was again reappointed as the CCPO of Lahore. The tussle between the Pakistan democratic movement (PDM) and Federal government to remove Dogar and PTI backed Punjab provisional government to retain Dogar as the CCPO of Lahore also presents a dismal scenario of improper use of power by political elites to achieve their objectives.

Many other scholars have written literature that is relevant to this research study. But the gap is that most of the literature is focused on discussing the issues related to public administration. Most of the literature takes a broader approach that makes it harder to pinpoint the issues related to public administration. This research

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<sup>23</sup> S. Patil, "Feudal Forces: Reform Delayed – Pakistan – GSDRC," *gsdrc.org*, February 10 (2013), <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/feudal-forces-reform-delayed-pakistan/>.

<sup>24</sup> Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, "Reforming Pakistan Police: An Overview," United Nations Asia, 2003.

<sup>25</sup> Tariq Parvez, "Brief Tenures of Police Leadership," *DAWN*, July 15 (2014), <https://www.dawn.com/news/1119220>.

<sup>26</sup> Correspondent Report, "Lahore's new CCPO takes charge," *The Express Tribune*, April 29 (2022), <https://www.google.com/amp/s/tribune.com.pk/story/2354712/lahores-new-ccpo-takes-charge%3famp=1>.

study discusses the issues of public administration by focusing on one position of the police department and that is CCPO Lahore. It is done to make the research study more focused and specific. This also enables the study to find out how the higher chain of command of public administration is affected by the political influence of the leaders. The study makes use of clientelism theory to address the gap found in literature. This theory is used because it explains how reciprocal exchange of goods and services between two or more actors for the purpose of political support.<sup>27</sup> Clientelism is often described as the process in which a patron provides support to his followers in exchange for their illegal services. Hicken exclaims that clientelistic relationships consist of four key elements; Dyadic relationship, Contingency, Hierarchy, and Iteration.<sup>28</sup> Clientelism is a tight bound informal understanding that is neither contractual nor legal. The concept of clientelism has received mixed opinions from scholars. While some argue that it may provide better outcomes suited to local needs,<sup>29</sup> most literature suggests that it is inefficient and dangerous. Scholars have argued that clientelism may result in the loss of accountability of politicians and parties to the voters,<sup>30</sup> obstruct proper development of political institutions<sup>31</sup> and administrative control.<sup>32</sup>

The study addresses the criticism that the clientelism theory lacks a causal analysis of events by focusing on the causal relationship between dependent and independent variables. It also considers the issue of generalization by focusing on the specific post of CCPOs of Lahore and conducting a comparative analysis of different officeholders. The study shows how CCPOs acted as clients and political elites as patrons, with the role of patron assumed by different political party elites and the client's role changing accordingly. The use of transfers from the post of

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<sup>27</sup>Miquel Pellicer, Eva Wegner, Markus Bayer, and Christian Tischmeyer, "Clientelism from the Client's Perspective: A Meta-Analysis of Ethnographic Literature," *Perspectives on Politics*, December 28 (2020), 1–17, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s153759272000420x>.

<sup>28</sup> Allen Hicken, "Clientelism," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 14, No. 1, June 15 (2011), 289–310, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.14.1.031908.220508>.

<sup>29</sup> Luis Roniger, Jean-Louis Briquet, Frederic Sawicki, Javier Auyero, and Simona Piattoni, "Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 3, April (2004), 353, <https://doi.org/10.2307/4150135>.

<sup>30</sup> Susan C. Stokes, "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (2005), 315–25.

<sup>31</sup> Luigi Graziano, "Patron-Client Relationship in Southern Italy," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April (1973), 3–34, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1973.tb01281.x>.

<sup>32</sup> Cesi Cruz, and Philip Keefer, "Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform." *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 14, August 11 (2015), 1942–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015594627>.

CCPOs as a benefit or punishment by political elites based on the services provided by the officers is also the focus of analysis in the study.

## Analysis

### Dyadic Relationship

Clientelism was first referred to as a dyadic relationship between the client and the patron. Hicken's view that this dyadic relationship element of clientelism has become complicated over the years.<sup>33</sup> The importance of face to face interaction between the client and patron is still present but recent studies have introduced broker systems in this relationship.<sup>34</sup> Some of these clientelist relations are very complex, starting from national politics to local municipal level.<sup>35</sup> Kitschelt & Wilkinson argue that in some conditions, like club goods (those goods in which one group benefits and these goods are withheld from the other groups) can serve as a clientelist exchange.<sup>36</sup> On the basis of this category, the data was collected from the participants and analyzed.

The first participant<sup>37</sup> response was:

The best example is from a friend of mine named 'Joiya'. He told me that his grandfather used to get calls from Shahbaz Sharif and others that there were posts (positions in the police department) available to appoint the ones you (Joiya's grandfather) wanted. Now, they (Joiya family) have appointed their paternal Uncle to a reputed government post. All these encounter specialists like Rao Anwar were appointed by Zardari (former president of Pakistan). Later, they were promoted by these politicians to higher rank. These officers know that these people (politicians) have appointed us. There will be transfers and promotion based on these people considerations.

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<sup>33</sup> Hicken, "Clientelism," 293.

<sup>34</sup> Wolfgang Muno, "Conceptualizing and measuring clientelism," *Paper presented at the workshop on Neopatrimonialism in Various World Regions, giga German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg*, (2010), [https://www.academia.edu/3024122/Conceptualizing\\_and\\_Measuring\\_Clientelism](https://www.academia.edu/3024122/Conceptualizing_and_Measuring_Clientelism).

<sup>35</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, "Citizens, Politicians, and Party Cartellization: Political Representation and State Failure in Post-Industrial Democracies," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 37, No. 2, March (2000), 149–79, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00508>.

<sup>36</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, and Steven I. Wilkinson, "Citizen–Politician Linkages: An Introduction." Edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, *Patrons, Clients, and Policies*, (2009), 1–49, <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511585869.001>.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with a Lawyer, Lahore, October 17, 2022.

The second participant<sup>38</sup> stated that:

It is confirmed that whichever set-up comes to power wants to place their men on the chair who yes boss to their order. This is the disgusting trend we have seen. Gusted officers of 17 scale were being appointed on the orders of Nawaz Sharif (former Prime Minister of Pakistan). They (Nawaz's government) started to take care of these officers, who eventually reached 21 scale in the central government. These officers, including several CCPOs, were controlled by Shahbaz Sharif (brother of Nawaz Sharif). Because for 10 years he (Shahbaz Sharif) ruled the Punjab government. And now, in his absence, he controlled the appointment of such officers that led to the failure of Usman Buzdar's (former chief minister of Punjab) government.

The third participant<sup>39</sup> said that:

Police officers, whether they are of higher rank or lower rank, build their connection with the MPA (member of provisional assembly) or MPA (member of national assembly) of the area they are transferred to. They (Officers) do so because they know their transfer and promotion is in the hands of these politicians.

The fourth participant<sup>40</sup> told that: "All these people are linked with each other behind the scenes. From day one, the powerful political elites appoint their people to such posts. Those who serve them move up the ranks and who don't are transferred."

The fifth participant<sup>41</sup> exclaimed that:

Whichever political party comes into power in Punjab, first, these parties try to control the bureaucracy, especially Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) and the Police Department. They want to accumulate power and benefits by appointing the CCPO, DPOs, IG and RPOs of their choice that have links with these parties.

The response from the participants highlights how political elites and CCPOs of Lahore maintained face-to-face interaction in clientelist relations. These statements also clarify how clientelist relations have become a complex network and broker system that starts from Pakistan national level politics and trickle all the way down to a lower level.

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<sup>38</sup> Interview with a Journalist, Lahore, December 22, 2022.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with a SHO, Lahore, January 19, 2023.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with a Bureaucrat, Lahore, November 27, 2022.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with a Political Analyst, Lahore, February 13, 2023.

## Contingency

The contingent nature of client-patron exchange is a similar element that is present in all definitions of clientelism given by scholars.<sup>42</sup> This element entails that the delivery of services by the client or patron or client is reciprocal to the benefit provided by the other party.<sup>43</sup> This nature of exchange distinguishes clientelist exchange from other types of exchange relationship. The nature of goods and benefits exchanges can be of material such as cash as well as nonmaterial nature like intervention with the bureaucracy.<sup>44</sup> In the case of CCPOs of Lahore, this element played an active role, as reinforced by the statements of different participants.

The first participant<sup>45</sup> exclaimed:

Someone (CCPO Lahore) I know had an incident with an MPA. Police officers of his (CCPO) area went to his (MPA) house and accused him (MPA) of gambling, which he declined straight away. They (police officers) called him outside, to which he (MPA) said no while they (Police officers) kept knocking. He (MPA) was a member of the current government and was very influential. He (MPA) pulled some strings and CCPO was transferred at that time with strict orders. After 6 to 7 months, he (CCPO) came back and conveyed to the MPA that from now on we would live in peace. So, as a result, MPA and Officer both benefited from the transfer later.

The second participant<sup>46</sup> said that “Sometimes these police officers (CCPOs of Lahore) also protect their own, because of their success in grades in future for which they compromise the interest of citizens, by affiliating themselves with a political party in which they see long term benefits according to their personal interest.”

The third participant<sup>47</sup> response was that “Yes, both parties are dependent on each other for services and benefits. But I think politicians get more out of it than officers.”

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<sup>42</sup> Hicken, “Clientelism,” 296.

<sup>43</sup> Luis Roniger, Jean-Louis Briquet, Frederic Sawicki, Javier Auyero, and Simona Piattoni, “Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 3, April (2004), 353, <https://doi.org/10.2307/4150135>.

<sup>44</sup> Judith Chubb, *Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

<sup>45</sup> Interview with a Lawyer.

<sup>46</sup> Interview with a Journalist.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with a SHO.

The fourth participant<sup>48</sup> told that:

All the people or I would say Mafia who appoint and those appointed benefit from this. All these people are dependent on each other in which big man is big man and common man is common. Everything started happening from the 1970's under Zulfikar Bhutto's government. The seats were sold at a price and those who bought them were transferred to higher posts. Nowadays, this phenomenon is increasing, like inflation in Pakistan.

The fifth participant<sup>49</sup> exclaimed that:

Both parties' benefit. He (CCPO) serves the political party that brought him through transfer to that position and the political party helps him (CCPO) achieve his interests like promotion and protection from corruption. It is a mutual relationship, not one side. Mostly, wankers are appointed CCPO and competent CSP officers are neglected.

In the study, the above responses from the participants who were interviewed indicate how the transfers of the CCPOs of Lahore were dependent on their services to the politicians. The services provided by the CCPOs were rewarded by the benefit of transfer to the CCPO post by the political elite who were in the ruling government at that time and those who did not pay heed to their orders were transferred from the post.

## Hierarchy

Hierarchy is also an important element of clientelist relationships. Scott states that clientelist relation is a type of exchange of services and benefits between a patron, who is at a higher socio-economic status, and a client, who is at a lower status.<sup>50</sup> Landé states that clientelism is a vertical dyadic relationship (relation between two people of unequal status, power, or resources).<sup>51</sup> As we analyze the data through the lens of this element, the statement from different participants reinforced the presence of this element in the CCPOs of Lahore abrupt transfer scenario.

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<sup>48</sup> Interview with a Bureaucrat.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with a Political Analyst.

<sup>50</sup> James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66, No. 1, March (1972), 91–113, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1959280>.

<sup>51</sup> Carl H. Landé, "Political Clientelism in Political Studies: Retrospect and Prospects," *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique*, Vol. 4, No. 4, (1983), 435–54, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601087>.

The first participant<sup>52</sup> stated that:

This (transfers) has been happening for a long time, but it didn't use to happen so rapidly. During their government, the PML-N members started to appoint and remove a lot of officers (CCPOs of Lahore) because they had the power to do so. And those (CCPOs of Lahore) who did not obey their (politicians) order were at the receiving end. It was like the Prime minister was their boss and could treat CCPOs of Lahore like animals in which he rewards the one who obeys him and punish those who don't.

The second participant<sup>53</sup> pronounced that:

As you see, the mayhem which arose from 2018 to 2022 related to CCPOs of Lahore transfer issues in our police force. In this scenario, a message was received that there is no need to work by the book. You (CCPOs) can be a part of the system by following their (political elite) orders. In doing so, they (political elites) provide benefits for the services provided by the officers (CCPOs of Lahore).

The third participant<sup>54</sup> response was:

There is nothing a police officer, whether he is of high rank like the CCPOs or IG or of lower rank, can do anything about their (Political elite) order. Because they are sitting in the office that can hold the power to transfer or even suspend the officers. And those who do not accept their orders are either pressured to do so or transferred like these so that the next officer (CCPO) can do it.

The fourth participant<sup>55</sup> told that: "Power elites demand such kinds of transfers when these officers don't listen to them. In this country, the theories and reforms don't apply as here these big political mafias control the people below."

The fifth participant<sup>56</sup> exclaimed that:

The political party that comes into power are the masters and CCPO officers are like servants to them. They only maintain this relationship for mutual benefit. The officer only says, 'yes sir' to them because he knows that these masters will give me a clean 'chit' (Ticket) on their corruption ticket.

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<sup>52</sup> Interview with a Lawyer.

<sup>53</sup> Interview with a Journalist.

<sup>54</sup> Interview with a SHO.

<sup>55</sup> Interview with a Bureaucrat.

<sup>56</sup> Interview with a Political Analyst.

In the scenario of the transfer of the CCPOs of Lahore, the responses of the various participants indicate the presence of elements of hierarchy. The study shows that the political elites (patrons) were at a higher status and controlled the benefits and punishment, which was in this case the transfers to and from the CCPO Lahore post. The police officers (clients) who were transferred to a CCPO post or from the post were at a lower status and provided services like pressurizing the opposing political party members by lodging different cases, providing security to patron party members as Ghulam Mehmood Dogar (previous CCPO of Lahore) did.<sup>57</sup>

### Critical Discourse

The element of the client-patron relationship that distinguishes it from other types of engagement is the ongoing nature of the relationship.<sup>58</sup> Iteration is directly linked to the other components of the clientelist relationship. For clientelist relation to occur, predictability and monitoring is important and that comes by repetitive exchange.<sup>59</sup> Another study suggests that repeated interaction promotes social norms of reciprocity that lets clientelist relation to develop.<sup>60</sup> On the basis of this element, when the data is analyzed, the study showed that CCPOs transfer was an ongoing process in which both parties' relationship was continuing. The participants response validates this element presence in the CCPOs of Lahore scenario.

The first participant<sup>61</sup> stated that:

Khan's government removed the main CCPOs officers that were under the influence of the PML-N party. But the new team they (the PTI government) brought were poor in their performance due to their lack of connections and influence. Punjab did not work properly under their command. So, they had to bring those previous CCPO officers back. All this has been happening for years, but it is now visible because now it is happening in Punjab, where all the mainstream media is.

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<sup>57</sup> Muhammad Shahzad, "Dogar Appointed CCPO for Second Time," *The Express Tribune*, July 30, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2368547/dogar-appointed-ccpo-for-second-time>.

<sup>58</sup> Hicken, "Clientelism," 301.

<sup>59</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds, "*Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>60</sup> S N Eisenstadt, and Luis Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

<sup>61</sup> Interview with a Lawyer.

The second participant<sup>62</sup> pronounced that:

These scenarios were all part of the system and have been happening for the last three decades. Unfortunately, police officers like these (CCPOs) are used the most by the civil government. One is appointed for certain political interests. And if they (officers) become loyal and serve over time, their (political elite) interests when needed are rewarded. This 'Thana Culture' has become a part of the system and is very hard to dismantle.

The third participant<sup>63</sup> response was:

I think the tenure of the officer job in a specific area matters a lot. As the political elites or feudal lords repeatedly order the officer to do something for them. The longer the officer stays in that area, the more connections he builds and the more benefits he receives.

The fourth participant<sup>64</sup> told that:

Till today, nothing has changed. The reason for that is, whoever came into power, take the example of Atezaz Ahsan, never did anything to change the system, even though he knew everything. Police order 2002 was also implemented to empower the police but nothing happened. These transfers and linkages were not developed overnight. These people were connected before and are connected till today to provide benefits to one another.

The fifth participant<sup>65</sup> exclaimed that:

Throughout the administrative services in Pakistan, there is a time limit for transfers. But all these abrupt transfers that occurred without any time limit gave a clear message that you (CCPO) will sustain your position by serving the political party over the time span of your service. If you (CCPO) do not complete their order, you will not sustain.”

The study indicates from the above statements how the transfer of the CCPOs of Lahore was based on clientelist element of iteration. As the officer who was once transferred from the post was again posted back in that position. This can be seen in the case of Ghulam Mehmood Dogar who was transferred from the CCPO

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<sup>62</sup> Interview with a Journalist.

<sup>63</sup> Interview with a SHO.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with a Bureaucrat.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with a Political Analyst.

Lahore post but was appointed back a few months later.<sup>66</sup> The same was the case with the other CCPOs of Lahore like Bilal Siddique Kamyana who were being transferred back and forth from the CCPO post based on their services to the political elites (patron) who were in the ruling government at the time.<sup>67</sup> There was an element of ongoing interaction present between the CCPOs of Lahore and politicians who transferred them.

### **Were the Transfers Based on Performance or Political Influence?**

The study found out that all the participants agreed that these transfers of CCPOs from Lahore were based on political influence. The transfers were based on the benefits and rewards given by the different political elites (Patrons) to the officers (Clients) who provided the services.

The first participant<sup>68</sup> said that:

In the last government, 6 CCPOs of Lahore were changed, which tells us that it was not based on their performance. Because in the case of performance, the federal government is responsible for their transfers. The law is very clear that once the CCPO is appointed he is obligated to complete his tenure of 3 years. He cannot be removed whenever the government feels like it. So, all these changes were political. Nothing was based on performance.

The second participant<sup>69</sup> response was:

According to me, it was all made up and a political move by the government. Such an abrupt change is not based on the performance of the CCPOs. I see it from a different lens. I consider it a demoralizing attempt on our police force. The Punjab government exploits such situations for their own motives, and it has been in practice for the last three decades.

The third participant<sup>70</sup> expressed that:

In every police department, officers do their work. It is not based on the performance that they are transferred but, on the service, they provide to the

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<sup>66</sup> Ahmer Khokhar, "Centre, Punjab Lock Horns over CCPO Removal," *ARY NEWS*, September 20 (2022), <https://www.google.com/amp/s/arynews.tv/ccpo-lahore-ghulam-mehmood-dogar-removed-from-post/amp/>.

<sup>67</sup> Asif Chaudhry, "Punjab Regime Change 'Ill Omen' for Police Officers," *DAWN.COM*, July 28 (2022), <https://www.dawn.com/news/1701865>.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with a Lawyer.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with a Journalist.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with a SHO.

different political personalities. They benefit by promotion if they do what political elites tell them to do. But if they don't, then the transfer is confirmed. So, all the transfers are on a political basis.

The fourth participant<sup>71</sup> told that:

Nothing was performance based, everything was done by the politicians and the elites that have key posts. All these people, politicians, and officers, just want to fill their pockets with cash collected through illegal means. These officers, about 60 to 70 percent, have also shifted their families and this money abroad to countries like Canada to settle there.

The fifth participant<sup>72</sup> exclaimed that, "As far as I have observed, all these transfers were totally on a political basis. Now and even in the past, there are cases where police service and transfers are totally politicized." Thus, the study through all these statements from the participants and findings shows that all the abrupt transfers were based on clientelist relations among offices and political elites and were politicized.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The study indicates the reason behind the abrupt transfer of CCPOs of Lahore from 2018 to 2022. It examined the client-patron relation between these officers and political elites by reviewing literature, secondary data and through semi-structured interviews as well. It proves the politicized influence that is practiced in public offices, specifically the police department. The four elements given by Hicken in his theory of clientelism – are used to analyze the data collected through secondary sources and interviews. It is found that abrupt transfers of CCPOs of Lahore are politicized and not based on performance. The study shows the presence of client-patron relations between officers transferred to and from the CCPO post and political elites who controlled these transfers. Based on the findings, some recommendations are suggested that can bring positive change, such as political will, public participation, separation of power, non-politicization of police departments, societal changes, public awareness, and merit-based promotion to rectify the situation.

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<sup>71</sup> Interview with a Bureaucrat.

<sup>72</sup> Interview with a Political Analyst.

Based on findings, following recommendations were made:

1. Political will and public participation are needed at the end of government to address this issue. Public demand and interest are to be considered by the government to rectify the situation.
2. Legislature should pass new laws through which power to transfer any police officer should be given to chief of the department, in this case IG of the police, instead of politicians. Thus, if any officer is to be transferred or removed it should be done by a proper inquiry that is headed by IG and Chief Minister. Politicians alone should not be given all the power and separation of power should be maintained.
3. A screening process or test system like CSS should be in place in case of promotion of officers. By doing this only those officers who are merit based and competent will get promoted. The benefit of promotion rewarded by political elites to the officers who do their bidding can be stopped through this process.
4. The Police Department should be made non-politicized and the decisions regarding the promotion should be taken on merit rather than on political influence.
5. Societal level changes are to be implemented if any rule of law-and-order situation is to be maintained. If politicians and elites do not refrain from interfering with the working of police, through political or any other means, no law or reform can change the situation.
6. The public should be given awareness about their rights and maintenance of rule of law. Because to change society, support of public is a key element that play a crucial role.